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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The question before this Court is whether a police officer can prolong a traffic stop to
verify that a non-owner driver had the owner's permission to drive the car. The answer is no.
Absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, an officer cannot further detain the driver to
confirm the owner's permission. This verification is not part of the traffic stop's mission-it is
neither an ordinary inquiry incident to the stop nor an attendant safety concern. Accordingly, in
the instant case, William Hale argues district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. He
asserts the district court should have granted his motion because the officer extended the traffic
stop to verify his permission to drive his friend's car. This extension of the stop, without
reasonable suspicion, violated Mr. Hale's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures. Therefore, he respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's order denying
his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this case for further
proceedings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A little after 9:00 p.m. on April 24, 2017, Officer Sessions stopped a car driven by
Mr. Hale. (R., p.122.) Officer Richardson arrived on scene about fifteen minutes later with his
drug dog. (R., p.125.) The dog alerted about two minutes later, and the officers found a pipe,
methamphetamine, and hydrocodone in the car. (R., pp.122, 125.) The next day, the State filed a
criminal complaint alleging Mr. Hale committed two counts of possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine and hydrocodone) and one count of possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.13-14.) At a preliminary hearing, held in July 2017, the magistrate found
probable cause for the offenses and bound Mr. Hale over to district court. (R., pp.26, 27, 28-29.)
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The State charged Mr. Hale by Information with two counts of possession of a controlled
substance and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.37-38.) Later, the district
court granted the State's motion to add a persistent violator sentencing enhancement for two
prior felony convictions. (R., pp.45--46, 53, 55-56.) Mr. Hale pied not guilty. (R., p.58.)
Prior to trial, Mr. Hale moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the car. (R., pp.8390.) He argued Officer Sessions did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.
(R., pp.87-89.) He also argued Officer Sessions unlawfully extended the stop for a dog sniff.
(R., pp.87-90.) The State opposed the motion. (R., pp.98-110.) The State asserted Officer
Sessions had reasonable suspicion for the stop, did not unlawfully extend the stop, and properly
searched the car upon the dog alert. (R., pp.101-10.)
The district court held a hearing, and Mr. Hale withdrew his argument on reasonable
suspicion to initiate the stop. (Tr.,1 p.11, Ls.1-9.) The State agreed not to contest Mr. Hale's
expectation of privacy to challenge the search of the car. (Tr., p.11, Ls.17-21.) Officer Sessions
and Officer Richardson testified. (R., pp.115-18.) The district court also admitted Officer
Sessions's body cam video of the stop. (State's Ex. 2 (two videos);2 R., p.115.) At the end of the
hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement. (R., p.118.) Mr. Hale later
supplemented his motion with additional authority from another district court judge that
examined the similar issue of an unlawfully prolonged stop for a dog sniff. (R., p.119.)
The district court issued an order denying the motion to suppress. (R., pp.122-29.) The
district court found, "Officer Sessions stopped Hale at approximately 9:04 p.m." (R., p.124.) The
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The transcripts are contained in 10 separate PDFs on appeal. The only transcript cited herein is
the first, titled: 1 20180118-145943 Hale.pd£ It is cited herein as "Tr."
2
Contemporaneously with this brief, Mr. Hale has moved to augment the record to include this
exhibit. Mr. Hale notes an exhibit admitted at trial was also labeled as State's Exhibit 2, but it is
not cited herein.
2

traffic stop occurred in Garden City at the Jackson's gas station on Chinden Boulevard and 44th
Street. (Tr., p.16, Ls.8-17, p.17, Ls.4-6.) The district court determined Officer Sessions lawfully
stopped Mr. Hale for not having a license plate or temporary permit displayed on the car. 3
(R., p.123.) The district court further found:
As Officer [Sessions] reached the vehicle, Hale handed him his driver's license.
Officer Sessions told Hale why he had been stopped. Hale pointed out that a
temporary permit actually was displayed in the upper right comer of the tinted
rear window. Officer Sessions shined his flashlight in that direction and saw the
temporary permit he hadn't been able to see beforehand. He continued speaking
to Hale before inspecting the temporary permit. He asked Hale for the vehicle's
registration and for proof of insurance. Hale said he had borrowed the car from a
friend, Marvell Kaykay, who lives nearby. Hale found a registration document in
the glove compartment. But he couldn't find proof of insurance, giving rise to a
reasonable and articulable suspicion-more than that, to probable cause-that
Hale was driving the vehicle in violation of LC. § 49-1232(1 ), which requires
drivers to have proof of insurance in their possession or inside their vehicles at all
times. Officer Sessions then inspected the temporary permit, which looked to be
in order, and returned to his police vehicle to initiate the ordinary license,
registration, and warrants checks that occur during a traffic stop. Along with
initiating those checks, Officer Sessions asked for a canine unit to be dispatched
to the scene. Only a few minutes had elapsed by then.
The routine checks revealed no concerns about the validity of Hale's
license or the vehicle's registration, nor did they reveal any outstanding warrant
for Hale. But they revealed an address for Kaykay inconsistent with what Hale
had told Officer Sessions about where Kaykay lives. The inconsistency
contributed to Officer Sessions' decision to check into Hale's claim that he had
Kaykay's permission to drive the vehicle. To that end, Officer Sessions initiated a
second interaction with Hale, during which Hale gave him Kaykay' s phone
number.
Officer Sessions then returned to his police vehicle, where he both tried to
reach Kaykay and began writing a citation for failure to provide proof of
insurance. The citation-writing began at 9: 14 p.m., about ten minutes after the
stop was initiated, but it was never finished. That's because the canine arrived and
alerted on the vehicle while Officer Sessions was on the phone with Kaykay,
asking whether Hale had his permission to drive the vehicle (yes, said Kaykay)
and whether the vehicle was insured (no, said Kaykay). The canine arrived at
about 9: 19 p.m. and the alert occurred about two minutes later, about seventeen
minutes after the stop was initiated. Before knowing about the alert, Officer
3

The district court also recognized Officer Sessions lawfully stopped Mr. Hale for loitering, in
violation of the Garden City Code, but Officer Sessions "never returned to that concern later in
the stop." (R., p.123 n.1.)
3

Sessions exited his police vehicle to initiate a third interaction with Hale, the
objective of which was to confirm that the address on Hale's driver's license was
his current address, so as to be sure to have the correct address for the planned
citation for failure to provide proof of insurance. On his way to talk to Hale about
that, though, Officer Sessions was approached by Deputy Richardson, who told
him about the alert and the subsequent discovery of drug paraphernalia inside the
vehicle.
(R., pp.124-25.) After the dog alert and paraphernalia discovery, the officers searched the car

again and found methamphetamine and hydrocodone. (R., p.125.)
In light of these factual findings, the district court determined Officer Sessions's initial
basis for the traffic stop (no license plate or temporary registration), ''was dispelled only a few
minutes into the stop .... " (R., p.126.) But, the district court explained, "two other concerns
emerged by then": (1) Mr. Hale's failure to provide proof of insurance and (2) his inconsistent
address for Mr. Kaykay compared to Mr. Kaykay's registration. (R., p.126.) As such, the district
court identified the critical question as "whether, in light of these two concerns, the stop was
lawfully ongoing" at the time of the dog alert. (R., p.126.) The district court noted the State
"disclaimed any argument that Officer Sessions had a reasonable articulable suspicion of drug
activity at any time before the canine alert occurred." (R., p.126 n.3.)
The district court rejected the first concern of no insurance, but accepted the second
concern of inconsistent addresses as a proper justification to prolong the stop. On the first
concern, the district court held:
Had Officer Sessions not been concerned with whether Hale actually had
Kaykay' s permission to drive the vehicle, and therefore had not devoted time to
trying to verify Hale's claim of permission by contacting Kaykay, Officer
Sessions might have been able to finish citing Hale for failure to provide proof of
insurance before the canine alert occurred. Whether the citation process would've
ended in that event before the canine alert occurred is simply unclear from the
record. It is, of course, the State's burden to prove that a search and seizure comes
within an exception to the warrant requirement. E.g., State v. Holland, 135 Idaho
159, 162 (2000). The Court concludes that the State hasn't proved that Hale's

4

failure to provide proof of insurance, in and of itself, justified Officer Sessions in
continuing Hale's seizure all the way up until the canine alert occurred.
(R., p.126.) In sum, the State did not prove Officer Sessions's investigation and citation for
Ms. Hale's failure to provide proof of insurance would have sufficiently prolonged the stop to
conduct the dog sniff.
On the second concern, the district court first recognized the State "proved that Officer
Sessions had only just obtained that verification [of permission from Mr. Kaykay], and then had
returned to the task of citation-writing, when he learned of the canine alert." (R., pp.126-27.) As
such, the district court stated, "The key issue, then, is whether Officer Sessions' desire to verify
that Hale had Kaykay' s permission to drive the vehicle justified him in continuing Hale's seizure
until then." (R., p.126.) The district court held it did. (R., pp.127-28.) The district court
determined, "Verifying a non-owner driver's claim of permission to drive the stopped vehicle
seems to serve" the same purpose as other ordinary inquires incident to a traffic stop. (R., p.126.)
The district court explained:
It is intuitive that, on average, a person driving someone else's vehicle without
permission poses a greater risk of unsafe driving than either a person driving his
own vehicle or a person driving someone else's car with permission. Indeed, that
person may well have committed a crime by doing so. See LC. § 49-227
(joyriding statute). Consequently, although the Court hasn't found an Idaho case
on the point, 4 the Court holds that an officer may, without unlawfully prolonging
a traffic stop, take reasonable steps to verify a non-owner driver's claim of
permission to drive the stopped vehicle, at least when there is some reason to be
skeptical of that claim (such as Hale's providing address information for Kaykay
that was inconsistent with the address yielded by routine traffic-stop checks,
casting doubt on whether Hale actually knew Kaykay), even the reasons for
skepticism don't rise to the level of a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
joyriding or auto theft.

4

The district court identified five federal circuit court cases that allowed limited detentions to
contact the car's owner or rental car company. (R., pp.127-28.) These cases were decided before
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).

5

(R., p.127.) "Thus," the district court concluded, "by taking a short period of time-again, the
canine alert occurred only about seventeen minutes after the stop-to verify Hale's claim of
having Kaykay's permission to drive the vehicle, Officer Sessions didn't unlawfully prolong the
stop." (R., p.128.) The district court denied Mr. Hale's motion to suppress. (R., p.129.)
Later, the district court conducted a two-day trial. (R., pp.187-200, 203-15.) The jury
found Mr. Hale guilty as charged. (R., p.245.) Mr. Hale admitted to the persistent violator
enhancement. (R., pp.214-15.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Hale to concurrent sentences of eight years, with two and
one-half years fixed, for each count of possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.263, 268.)
For possession of drug paraphernalia, the district court sentenced Mr. Hale to credit for time
served. (R., pp.263, 268.) Mr. Hale timely appealed from the district court's judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.267-70, 272-75.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Hale's motion to suppress because Officer Sessions
unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop to verify Mr. Hale's permission to drive the car?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Hale's Motion To Suppress Because Officer Sessions
Unlawfully Extended The Traffic Stop To Verify Mr. Hale's Permission To Drive The Car

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hale challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress because the

district court erred in ruling Officer Sessions could prolong the traffic stop to verify Mr. Hale's
permission from Mr. Kaykay to drive the car. Mr. Hale contends Officer Sessions's permission
verification went beyond an ordinary inquiry incident to a traffic stop or an attendant safety
concern. Without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Officer Sessions could not continue
to detain Mr. Hale for this verification. Due to the unlawful extension of the stop, the district
court erred by denying Mr. Hale's motion to suppress evidence obtained after the dog alert.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). "The Court accepts the trial court's
findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence." State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234 (2005).
The Court exercises free review of "the trial court's application of constitutional principles to the
facts found." Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.

C.

The District Court Should Have Granted Mr. Hale's Motion To Suppress Because Officer
Sessions's Extension Of The Traffic Stop To Verify Mr. Hale's Permission To Drive The
Car Was Neither Tied To The Stop's Mission Nor Supported By Reasonable Suspicion
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). "Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that '[t ]he right of the people
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to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated."' State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in
original). "Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Morgan, 154
Idaho 109, 112 (2012) (quoting State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658 (2007)). "Limited
investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable
suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." Id.
Here, Mr. Hale waived any challenge to Officer Sessions' s initial basis for the traffic
stop. (Tr., p.11, Ls.4-9.) Consistent with this waiver, the district court determined Officer
Sessions had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop for no license plates or temporary
registration. (R., p.123.) But, the district court also determined these initial justifications were
dispelled as two other potential justifications emerged: failure to provide proof insurance and an
inconsistent address for Mr. Kaykay. (R., p.126.) The district court rejected the first justification
(no insurance) because the State did not prove Officer Sessions would still have been working on
tasks related to a no-insurance citation "all the way up until" the dog alerted. (R., p.126.) That
left the inconsistent addresses as the only justification for the prolonged stop. (R., pp.126-27.)
Although the district court ruled Officer Sessions could prolong the stop to verify Mr. Hale's
permission to drive Mr. Kaykay's car, Mr. Hale argues the district court's ruling was in error.
(See R., pp.127-28.) Officer Sessions's verification was not an ordinary inquiry related to the
traffic stop, and it was not related to any safety concerns. The district court should have granted
Mr. Hale's motion to suppress on this basis.

9

1.

Officer Sessions's extension of the traffic stop to verify Mr. Hale's permission to
drive his friend's car was not part of the stop's mission

"A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation."

Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). "Like a Terry5 stop, the tolerable
duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Id.
(citations omitted). The traffic stop may last no longer than necessary to effectuate that purpose.

Id. "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or
reasonably should have been-completed." Id.
Relevant here, the Rodriguez Court outlined the permissible inquires tied to the officer's
"mission":
Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's mission includes
"ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 408 (2005). Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's license,
determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance.
135 S. Ct. at 1615 (alteration in original). The U.S Supreme Court reasoned, "These checks serve
the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring the vehicles on the road are
operated safely and responsibly." Id. (citations omitted). As for the related safety concerns, the
U.S. Supreme Court highlighted that "the safety interest stems from the mission of the stop
itself." Id. at 1616. The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged, "Traffic stops are especially fraught
with danger to police officers, so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome
precautions in order to complete his mission safely." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately, Rodriguez held a dog sniff was not "part of the officer's traffic mission." Id. at 1615.

5

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Rodriguez thus identified two permissible tasks for an officer during a traffic stop other
than deciding to issue a ticket: (1) attendant safety concerns and (2) ordinary inquires incident to
the stop. Neither apply here to allow Officer Sessions to prolong the stop.
First, on the issuance of a ticket, there was no evidence that Officer Sessions' s
verification of a non-owner's permission to drive the car was at all necessary to complete a
traffic citation for failure to provide proof of insurance. Indeed, the district court found Officer
Sessions may have completed the citation but for his deviation from the stop's mission to verify
Mr. Hale's permission. (R., p.126.) Thus, Officer Sessions's verification was not necessary to
issue the citation to Mr. Hale.
Second, Officer Sessions's verification of Mr. Hale's permission to drive the car did not
attend to a safety concern related to the stop. Mr. Hale had a valid driver's license and no
outstanding warrants. (R., p.125.) The name that Mr. Hale gave to Officer Sessions for the car's
owner, Mr. Kaykay, matched the car's registration information. (See R., pp.124-25.) The car was
not reported stolen, and there was no evidence of a stolen car, such as a broken window.
(Tr., p.47, L.17-p.48, L.7, p.60, Ls.1-11, p.65, L.18-p.66, L.3, p.78, Ls.13-19.) Although
Mr. Hale told Officer Sessions that he had a knife, and Officer Sessions saw a baseball bat in the
backseat, (State's Ex. 2, Video 1, 1:59-2: 13), Officer Sessions did nothing to secure these two
items. And, certainly, Officer Session's verification of permission to drive the car does not have
any relation to securing those items. Lastly, the State presented no evidence to make any rational
inference that a non-owner driver poses a greater threat to an officer than an owner/driver.
Therefore, Officer Sessions' s verification of Mr. Hale's permission to drive the car did not serve
to protect Officer Sessions's or the general public's safety. This verification was not a related
safety check to allow the extended stop.

11

Third, verification from the owner on permission to drive the car is not an ordinary
inquiry incident to the stop. Rodriguez's "typical[ ]" inquiries included "checking the driver's
license," checking for outstanding warrants, and "inspecting" the car's registration and proof of
insurance. 135 S. Ct. at 1615. Verifying the driver's permission from the owner is not akin to
these routine checks for license, registration, and insurance. Unlike those checks, this verification
is entirely subjective and beyond the driver's control. An officer could detain a non-owner driver
indefinitely-either until the officer obtained a satisfactory verification or gave up. Moreover,
allowing this verification erodes the protections provided by Rodriguez to allow other kinds of
"verifications." Any rationale for Officer Sessions's verification here could easily be extended to
justify delays to verify a variety of information obtained from the driver, such as the driver's
origin, destination, route, or purpose of travel. In addition, the presence of a non-owner driver
does not, in and of itself, create an unsafe and irresponsible operation of a car. The license,
registration, and insurance inquiries are to ensure cars on the road "are operated safely and
responsibly," id., but there is nothing inherently dangerous or illegal about a non-owner driver.
Thus, verification of the driver's permission to use the car does not fall under the normal
Rodriguez "checks."

As such, the district court's ruling to allow this verification runs contrary to Rodriguez's
limits on the constitutional duration of a traffic stop. The district court determined verifying
permission serves the same purpose as other ordinary inquiries because "a person driving
someone else's vehicle without permission poses a greater risk of unsafe driving than either a
person driving his own vehicle or a person driving someone else's car with permission."
(R., p.127.) The district court also noted a non-owner that drives a vehicle without permission

could be committing the crime of joyriding, LC. § 49-227. These concerns, however, start with
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the assumption that the non-owner driver lacks permission to drive the car. Starting with an
assumption of wrongdoing or illegality would allow the same delay as the one prohibited in
Rodriguez-if the U.S. Supreme Court began with the assumption that drivers keep illegal

substances in their cars, then suspicionless dog sniffs would have been entirely permissible to
keep the roads safe and crime-free. But Rodriguez rejected these mere assumptions of illegality.
Otherwise, an officer could conduct a baseless fishing expedition or act on a hunch "in the hope
that something would tum up." 6 Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982). This is not to say
an officer can never verify an owner's permission, but the officer must have reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity to allow that delay for a new investigation. Rodriguez,
135 S. Ct. at 1615 ("An officer ... may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise
lawful traffic stop. But ... , he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the
reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual."). Therefore, the
district court's decision is inconsistent with Rodriguez.
In summary, the district court erred by ruling Officer Sessions' s decision to verify
Mr. Hale's permission to drive Mr. Kaykay's car was part of the traffic stop's "mission." It was
not. Officer Sessions' s verification was unnecessary for his decision to issue a ticket, unrelated to
an attendant safety concern, and not an ordinary inquiry incident to the stop. Mr. Hale submits
this Court should hold, absent reasonable suspicion, an officer cannot extend a traffic stop to
contact the owner and verify the driver's permission to the use the car.

6

For example, if the driver informed the officer that he had a firearm in the car, this assumption
of illegality would allow the officer to extend the stop to run the firearm's serial number to verify
it was not stolen.
13

2.

Officer Sessions did not have reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop for
verification that Mr. Hale, a validly licensed driver, had permission to drive his
friend's properly registered car

As a "new seizure," State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609 (2016), Officer Sessions did not
have reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop for verification of Mr. Hale's permission from
Mr. Kaykay to drive the car.
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts." Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (quoting State v.

Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). "[A]n officer may take into account his experience and law
enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered," Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, but
"[t]he officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an 'inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch."' United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also

Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (same). "The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop." Morgan, 154 Idaho at
112.
In this case, the only reason Officer Sessions decided to inquire further was because
Mr. Hale did not tell him the same address listed on the car's registration. Mr. Hale told Officer
Sessions that Mr. Kaykay "lives right across from here ... [inaudible] freeway." (State's Ex. 2,
Video 1, 1:50-1 :54) Officer Sessions understood this to be somewhere in Garden City.
(Tr., p.79, Ls.17-18.) In contrast, Mr. Kaykay's address from Officer Sessions's routine checks
was a Boise address. (R., p.126; Tr., p.24, Ls.17-20, p.65, Ls.9-11.) Based on the totality of the
circumstances, an inconsistent address between where Mr. Hale believed Mr. Kaykay lived and
where Mr. Kaykay registered his car did not give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.

14

For one, it is not reasonable to expect a non-owner driver to know the address provided
by the owner for his car's registration. A vehicle's owner can register with his "physical domicile
residence address or the business physical principal address." LC. § 49-401B(5) (emphasis
added). Registration must be updated annually or biennially. LC. §§ 49-402, -402B, -430. The
owner, or registrant, has thirty days to update a change of address. LC. § 49-421(3). Thus, a
driver with permission from the owner may not know the owner's precise registered address for
the car. That lack of knowledge does not establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Next, in this case, the distinction between a Garden City address and a Boise address did
not give Officer Sessions reasonable suspicion that criminal activity, such as theft or joyriding,
was afoot. Mr. Hale willingly answered Officer Sessions's questions. (See generally State's Ex.
2, Video 1, 0:31-2:28.) He gave Officer Sessions the correct name of the car's owner, and the
type of car matched the registration. (See Tr., p.53, Ls.6-16.) The car was not reported stolen.
(Tr., p.47, L.17-p.48, L.7, p.60, Ls.1-11, p.65, L.18-p.66, L.3, p.78, Ls.13-19.) Officer Sessions
did not testify to any observations of Mr. Hale being evasive or failing to cooperate. Nor did
Officer Sessions observe Mr. Hale to be under the influence of alcohol or otherwise impaired.
(Tr., p.61, L.23-p.62, L.21.) Lastly, Mr. Hale had a valid license and no outstanding warrants for
his arrest. (R., p.125.) Therefore, the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Sessions did
not create reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Hale had committed or was about to commit
a crime with Mr. Kaykay' s car to justify the delay for verification. 7

7

Since the district court determined the verification was part of the traffic stop's mission, the
district court did not make an alternative ruling on whether Officer Sessions had reasonable
suspicion to justify a prolonged extension. (R., p.127.) However, the district court seemed to
indicate it would not find reasonable suspicion:
Consequently, although the Court hasn't found an Idaho case on the point, the
Court holds that an officer may, without unlawfully prolonging a traffic stop, take
15

3.

The district court should have suppressed all evidence obtained from Officer
Sessions' s unlawful extension of the traffic stop

Without reasonable suspicion to extend the stop, Officer Sessions unlawfully prolonged
the stop in violation of Mr. Hale's Fourth Amendment rights. "[A] police stop exceeding the
time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution's shield
against unreasonable seizures." Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1612; see also Linze, 161 Idaho at 608
(adopting and applying Rodriguez). "This rule is both broad and inflexible. It applies to all
extensions of traffic stops including those that could reasonably be considered de minimis."

Linze, 161 Idaho at 608. As in Rodriguez and Linze, Mr. Hale's Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when Officer Sessions abandoned the purpose of the stop and initiated a new seizure for
verification from Mr. Kaykay. See Linze, 161 Idaho at 609 (holding that when an officer
abandons stop's original purpose for new purpose, defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are
violated unless the officer has reasonable suspicion for new purpose). Therefore, Mr. Hale
submits the district court should have suppressed the evidence obtained after unlawful extension
of the stop. See id. (reversing the district court's order denying a motion to suppress upon
holding dog sniff unlawfully prolonged traffic stop); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional police conduct subject to
exclusion); Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810-11 (same).

reasonable steps to verify a non-owner driver's claim of permission to drive the
stopped vehicle, at least when there is some reason to be skeptical of that claim
(such as Hale's providing address information for Kaykay that was inconsistent
with the address yielded by routine traffic-stop checks, casting doubt on whether
Hale actually knew Kaykay), even the reasons for skepticism don 't rise to the
level of a reasonable and articulable suspicion ofjoyriding or auto theft.
(R., p.127 (emphasis added).) By arguing on appeal the facts did not establish reasonable
suspicion, Mr. Hale does not concede the district court ruled there was reasonable suspicion.
16

CONCLUSION
Mr. Hale respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying his
motion to suppress, vacate the district court's judgment of conviction, and remand his case for
further proceedings.
DATED this *7 thday ofNovember, 2019.
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